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Abstract. We study a novel principle for safe and efficient collision avoidance
that adopts a mathematically elegant and general framework making as much as
possible abstraction of the controlled vehicle’s dynamics and of its environment.
Vehicle dynamics is characterized by pre-computed functions for accelerating
and braking to a given speed. Environment is modeled by a function of time
giving the free distance ahead of the controlled vehicle under the assumption
that the obstacles are either fixed or are moving in the same direction. The main
result is a control policy enforcing the vehicles speed so as to avoid collision
and efficiently use the free distance ahead, provided some initial safety condition
holds.
The studied principle is applied to the design of two discrete controllers, one
synchronous and another asynchronous. We show that both controllers are safe
by construction. Furthermore, we show that their efficiency strictly increases for
decreasing granularity of discretization. We present implementations of the two
controllers, their experimental evaluation in the Carla autonomous driving simu-
lator and investigate various performance issues.
Keywords: Safe and efficient collision avoidance, Autonomous vehicles, Model based
design
1 Introduction
As a fundamental requirement for autonomous vehicle control, the problem of collision
avoidance has been widely investigated using a big variety of approaches and frame-
works. These involve control-based techniques, game theory, formal methods including
reachability analysis and logic-based controller synthesis or the design of specific proto-
cols. Furthermore, the assumptions underlying the adopted frameworks vary regarding
the level of modeling of the dynamics of the controlled vehicle, the number of vehicles
and the type of their trajectories or the nature of the controller stimuli.
In this problem, the key issue is the development of control algorithms of tractable
complexity guaranteeing collision avoidance and making efficient use of the available
space. It should be emphasized that most of the existing results fail to satisfy at least
one of these requirements. Most results focus on performance optimization and only
partially satisfy safety requirements. Some results involve decision processes requiring
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computationally heavy analysis and others propose theoretically correct solutions that
are not robust when discretized. Finally, some results put emphasis exclusively on safety
under various scenarios and neglect performance which is not acceptable for cars; lack
of performance can become a safety issue as for instance in an overtaking maneuver.
We study a novel principle for safe and efficient collision avoidance. We adopt a
mathematically simple and general framework making abstraction of the controlled ve-
hicle’s specific dynamics and of its environment, and using only three functions: (1)
the free distance function F (t) which determines for the vehicle the estimated free dis-
tance from the closest obstacle ahead at time t; (2) the accelerating function A(V, v)
which gives the distance travelled by the vehicle when accelerating from initial speed
V to speed v; (3) the braking function B(V, v) which gives the distance travelled by the
vehicle when braking from V to speed v (v < V ).
The principle consists in the application of a simple induction rule. If at some time
t the speed of the vehicle with respect to the distance F (t) is safe, i.e. B(V, 0) ≤ F (t),
then the speed will be controlled to remain safe under the assumption that F (t) does
not change faster than the vehicle can brake. This assumption always holds when the
obstacles ahead are fixed or move in the same direction as the controlled vehicle. Fur-
thermore, if safety can be guaranteed for speed V and B(V, 0) ≤ F (t) then in order to
efficiently use the available space F (t)−B(V, 0) we apply an A/B (Accelerating/Brak-
ing) policy: we accelerate to a certain speed v > V , such that after acceleration it is still
possible to safely brake from v. So efficiency boils down to computing the maximum
target speed v such that 0 ≤ F − (A(V, v) +B(v, 0)). This computation may be costly
depending on the properties of the accelerating and braking distance functions. The con-
trol principle consists in the dynamic application of A/B policies for a set of possible
speed levels between speed 0 and the limit speed of the vehicle. For each speed level,
it uses precomputed conditions for safely switching to adjacent speed levels depending
on the free distance ahead.
We provide two different controllers for safe and efficient collision avoidance. The
first controller is synchronous driven by periodically sampled values of the free distance
F . The second controller is asynchronous receiving sporadically available values of F .
We prove that both controllers are safe and efficient, where efficiency means that based
on the most recent value of F , getting closer to the obstacle ahead may jeopardize
safety. We also present their implementations and experimental evaluations in Carla
autonomous driving simulator and investigate various performance issues.
Our approach is characterized by the following:
1. It makes abstraction of the vehicle dynamics through the use of accelerating and
braking functions that provide all the information needed for safe and efficient con-
trol. These functions are a kind of ”contact” between the controller and the con-
trolled vehicle. Their use frees us from the obligation to model vehicle dynamics.
Furthermore, it leaves completely open the way features related to comfort such as
the jerk profile are implemented.
2. Although we consider the problem in one dimension and the environment is mod-
eled by a free distance function F (t), the result can be easily extended to two di-
mensions. In that case F (t) and B(v, V ) become areas and the safety test consists
in checking their inclusion.
3. The control principle is robust and easy to adapt to varying uncertainty in the mea-
surement of F or in the estimation of the functions A and B.
4. The proposed implementations do not have any specific hardware requirements and
require very limited computing resources as they combine pre-computed control
policies.
5. Finally, the adopted control principle is simple and inductive: if at some step the
distance is safe then a speed increase by some quantity will not jeopardize safety.
This induction hypothesis is used to prove correctness.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 presents
the framework and the principle of safe and efficient collision avoidance control. Sec-
tion 4 presents the design of the collision avoidance controllers. Section 5 presents the
implementations and performance evaluations using the Carla simulator. Section 6 con-
cludes about the relevance of the results and outlines directions for future work.
2 Related work
Collision avoidance has been extensively studied in the context of adaptive cruise con-
trol. Most work addresses the problem by applying optimization techniques [24,17,23].
For instance, [24] models the ego vehicle and the obstacles around as convex sets, and
generates collision-free trajectories by solving a set of smooth non-convex constraints.
In [17], safe trajectories are calculated based on a non-linear model predictive con-
trol approach for both lateral and longitudinal movements. The work in [23] applies
the concept of artificial potential field and identifies five stages in the process of ob-
stacle avoidance. In [1], a hierarchical framework consisting of a nominal controller
and an emergency controller has been studied. The former is based on model predic-
tive control (MPC) strategy and operates under normal conditions to achieve passenger
comfort without considering safety guarantee, while the latter takes over if the head-
way approaches clearance distance constraints and ensures provable safety. However,
the scheme considers multiple leading vehicles and designs a controller for each of
them, thus incurring increased computational cost. Finally, several works deal with col-
lision avoidance methods relying on rich environment information (e.g., position, speed,
width of the surrounding vehicles) from V2I or V2V communication [14,11]. Despite
the promising results achieved by such approaches, optimization-based and potential
field-based collision avoidance strategies do not allow safety guarantees, which are es-
sential for autonomous vehicles. Additionally, they may lead to high computation cost
in real-world implementations.
To ensure guaranteed safety and achieve correctness-by-construction, Mobileye [20]
advocated the application of model-based techniques. The proposed concept of Respon-
sibility Sensitive Safety (RSS) relies on the computation of the safe distance between
vehicles. It is argued that if a vehicle maintains the required safe distance from other
vehicles, it will never be responsible for an accident even if it might still become in-
volved in an accident. Different estimates of safety distance are proposed under the
assumption of constant response time for acceleration and deceleration. Furthermore,
in order to avoid the unnecessarily large gap between vehicles caused by situation-
unaware strategies in [20], it is shown how to improve the safe distance conditions by
taking into account the state of the ego-vehicle (pause, acceleration, deceleration) [10].
Nonetheless, this work focuses only on conditions guaranteeing safety and does not
address control issues. Similarly, nVIDIA proposes a formal safety model, namely the
Safety Force Field (SFF) [16], which brings in the concept of Safety Potential to eval-
uate the safety of traffic actors. An SFF function is defined to derive safety procedures
that move an actor down the gradient of safety potential, resulting in actors repelling
from each other when safety procedures are about to overlap. As RSS, SFF exclusively
focuses on safety, and does not address efficiency issues. As a matter of fact, a study
[25] reveals that simply implementing RSS requirements leads to undesirable clearance
distance and thus to decrease of traffic efficiency.
Model-based design for autonomous vehicles have been an active research area
since 30 years. In the California PATH (Partners for Advanced Transportation and
Highways) program, the concept of platoon has been proposed to mitigate the highway
congestion. A platoon is a group of closely spaced vehicles under automatic control. In
[22], the design of platoon controllers has been investigated and a multi-layer automated
highway system architecture has been proposed in order to achieve a fully automated
platoon control. In [13], the analysis of [22] is refined using hybrid controllers and suf-
ficient safety conditions are provided. Finally, [7] presents the safety and performance
analysis of a hybrid system modeling an autonomous vehicle.
There are several works involving application of formal methods to autonomous ve-
hicle control. In [21][19], safety of the adaptive cruise control is verified by predicting
and checking reachable states of ego and other vehicles, which is however computation-
ally extensive. In [2], barrier certificates provide safety guarantee by defining a ‘barrier’
that prevents transitions from safe states to unsafe ones. [3] studies the distributed co-
ordination of autonomous vehicles in order to avoid collisions in intersections. The co-
ordination protocol is modeled in a constraint specification language and the automated
constraint solver (i.e. Z3) is used to verify safety. [9] presents the design and formal
verification of a supervisor switching between nominal planners and a safe stop rou-
tine if nominal operational conditions are violated. In [8], a supervisor for an advanced
driver assistance system is automatically synthesized from the specifications modeled
by finite state machines. The correctness of the switching logic is also formally verified.
In [15], a controller is synthesized from linear temporal logic specifications for adaptive
cruise control. In [6] an approach is presented for proving collision freedom of multi-
lane traffic with lane-change maneuver. The multi-lane motorway traffic is modeled as
an abstract transition system and the collision freedom property is specified in spatial
logic. Then the safety verification problem boils down to checking that the abstract
transition system satisfies spatial logic formulas. In [5], linear temporal logic is used to
formalize traffic rules for both overtaking and merging maneuvers. Furthermore, these
rules are verified on the automata modeling the behavior of an autonomous vehicle. A
motion planner modeled as a maneuver automaton is presented in [18]. For each state of
this model a particular motion control primitive is applied. The desired plan is specified
by a formula of linear temporal logic, and logical correctness is reduced to to checking
satisfiability of the formula. Finally, several papers discuss the application of formal
verification to the decision and control software of autonomous vehicles e.g., [12,26].
3 Safe and efficient collision avoidance control
The aim is to control the movement of a vehicle travelling in a one-way lane, so as to
1) avoid collision with other objects that may be fixed or moving in the same direction
(i.e., safety); and 2) use the available free distance ahead in the best possible manner to
minimize travelling time (i.e., efficiency).
Our work relies on a mathematically abstract framework characterized by three
functions. We denote by v the speed variable of the vehicle and by V its initial speed.
– The function F (t) gives the free distance at time t between the controlled vehi-
cle and the closest obstacle ahead, which either moves in the same direction or is
stopped.
– The braking function B(V, v) is a partial function defined in the interval 0 ≤ v ≤
V . It gives the distance travelled by the controlled vehicle when braking from the
initial speed V to a target speed v. In Fig.1 it is graphically illustrated by the green
curves. When the target speed v = 0 (i.e, the vehicle brakes to stop), this function
is abbreviated as B(V ) for simplicity.
– The accelerating function A(V, v) is a partial function defined in the interval V ≤
v ≤ VL, where VL is a given limit speed for each vehicle. It gives the distance
travelled by the vehicle when accelerating from an initial speed V to a target speed
v. In Fig.1 it is graphically illustrated by the black curves.
Fig. 1. Braking and acceleration distance functions (D is the distance travelled and v is the speed)
We make no specific assumptions about the implementation of accelerating and
braking functions, e.g. whether acceleration and deceleration are constant or variable.
Nonetheless, we require that the following properties hold:
– B(V, V ) = 0 and A(V, V ) = 0.
– Additivity property:
B(V, v1) +B(V1, v2) = B(V, v2), where v1 = V1
A(V, v1) +A(V1, v2) = A(V, v2), where v1 = V1
– Strict monotonicity:
B(V, v1) < B(V, v2), when v1 < v2
A(V, v1) < A(V, v2), when v1 < v2
The additivity property implies that for 0 ≤ j < i ≤ n,
B(vi, vj) =
i−j−1∑
k=0
B(vi−k, vi−k−1)
A(vj , vi) =
i−j−1∑
k=0
A(vj+k, vj+k+1)
This says that the distance needed to brake or accelerate to a given speed is the same no
matter how braking and acceleration commands have been applied.
As an example, when acceleration and deceleration rates are constant, respectively
a and b, these functions are given by the following formulas:
B(V, v) = V ∗ (V − v)/b− 1/2 ∗ (V − v)2/b
A(V, v) = V ∗ (v − V )/a+ 1/2 ∗ (v − V )2/a
We progressively study the safe and efficient collision avoidance problem for a ve-
hicle moving in a one-way lane. We first study the problem for a stationary obstacle
ahead. Then we study algorithms that solve the problem for dynamically changing free
distance. We assume that the movement is controlled using commands for accelerating
and braking from a speed V to some target speed v whose effect is modeled by the
functions A(V, v) and B(V, v), respectively.
3.1 Control for safety
The basic idea for avoiding collision is to moderate the speed of the vehicle and antici-
pate the changes of the free space ahead so as to have enough distance and time to adjust
and brake. If the vehicle moves with speed V at time t, then for safety the free space
ahead F (t) should be longer than the braking distanceB(V ), which is the minimal safe
braking distance for speed V . The Theorem below formalizes this idea.
Theorem 1. If at time t the speed Vt of the vehicle is safe with respect to F (t), i.e.,
B(Vt) ≤ F (t) and for any time t +4t it is possible to set the speed to a value Vt+4t
such that the condition F (t)−F (t+4t) ≤ B(Vt)−B(Vt+4t) holds, then the vehicle
is always safe.
Proof. The condition F (t)−F (t+4t) ≤ B(Vt)−B(Vt+4t) relates changes of F (t) to
the changes of speed V . It simply says that the free space ahead does not change faster
than the distance that the vehicle travels in some interval4t. It can be deduced from the
safety assumption 0 ≤ F (t)−B(Vt) and from the condition that 0 ≤ F (t)−B(Vt) ≤
F (t+4t)−B(Vt+4t).
Fig. 2. Illustration of the control for safety
Notice as an application of the above theorem, that if the vehicle brakes from speed
Vt and the obstacles ahead do not move in the opposite direction, then the condition
F (t)−F (t+4t) ≤ B(Vt)−B(Vt+4t) trivially holds. In fact, when the vehicle brakes
from Vt for time 4t, it will reach the speed Vt+4t < Vt and it will have traveled the
distance B(Vt, Vt+4t) = B(Vt)−B(Vt+4t), by application of the additivity property.
Then we have that F (t) − (B(Vt) − B(Vt+4t)) is the distance ahead at time t +4t
for the controlled vehicle, as shown in Fig.2. By the assumption that the obstacles are
moving forward or stopped, we have that F (t) − (B(Vt) − B(Vt+4t)) ≤ F (t +4t).
Thus Theorem1 can trivially be applied if obstacles ahead do not move in the opposite
direction.
This theorem suggests a simple and safe control policy that ensures collision free-
dom. For any time t, the vehicle only needs to keep track of the free distance ahead F (t)
and check in real-time whether F (t) is greater than the minimal safe braking distance
B(Vt) for the current speed Vt. It starts braking as soon as F (t) reaches the minimal
safe braking distance. In this way, it is guaranteed that if the obstacles ahead do not
move in the opposite direction, no collision would happen.
3.2 Achieving efficiency for fixed obstacles
The above result provides a basis for ensuring collision freedom. Nonetheless, it leaves
open the question of how the vehicle can efficiently use the available distance ahead
by minimizing the travelling time. What would be an efficient driving policy when the
free headway distance is greater than the minimal safe braking distance? We consider
that a policy defines the speed function v(t) in response to a free distance F (t). An
Accelerating/Braking policy (A/B policy) is a policy of accelerating first to some speed
and then braking. Similarly, an Braking/Accelerating policy (B/A policy) is the policy
of braking first to some speed and then accelerating. A Constant speed/Braking policy
(C/B policy) is the policy of moving at constant speed and then braking. A policy is
safe if the relative distance between the controlled vehicle and the obstacle ahead is
positive. It is efficient if increasing the speed value v(t) enforced by the policy at any
point would compromise safety.
The problem is to minimize the travelling time for a given distance, which implies to
maximize the average speed. Consider the scenario where the speed of the vehicle is V
and there is a stationary obstacle ahead at distance F , which is greater than the braking
distance B(V ). The application of an A/B policy consists in computing an appropriate
target speed v, V < v ≤ VL, accelerate the vehicle to v and then brake to full stop. To
ensure collision freedom, the total travelled distance A(V, v) +B(v) must be such that
A(V, v) +B(v) ≤ F . The maximal target speed is given by the following condition.
vM = max{v | F ≥ A(V, v) +B(v)}
Such a speed exists as both acceleration and braking functions are monotonically in-
creasing with respect to the target speed v. Notice that either vM ≤ VL and F =
A(V, vM ) +B(vM ) or vM = VL and F > A(V, vM ) +B(vM ).
As an example, for motion at constant acceleration and deceleration (a and b, re-
spectively), we haveA(V, v) = v∗(v−V )/a+(v−V )2/2∗a andB(v) = v2/2∗b. Then
the safety condition becomes F ≥ v ∗ (v − V )/a + (v − V )2/2 ∗ a + v2/2 ∗ b, from
which we deduce v ≤ √(2 ∗ a ∗ b ∗ F + b ∗ V 2)/(a+ b). Thus the maximal target
speed vM =
√
(2 ∗ a ∗ b ∗ F + b ∗ V 2)/(a+ b). As we require that v ≥ V , we have
F ≥ V 2/2 ∗ b = B(V ) and thus the maximal target speed always exists. Let vF denote
the speed reached by accelerating along distance F (t), i.e., v2F − V 2 = 2 ∗ F (t) ∗ a,
then the formula can be simplified as vM = vF ∗
√
b/(a+ b).
Fig. 3. The A/B control policy for different values of the free distance F ahead
Fig. 3 illustrates the A/B control policy where F is the free distance ahead and v is
the speed of the controlled vehicle. The green curves illustrate braking phases and the
black the accelerating phase from an initial speed V1. For F = F1, the maximal target
speed V ′1 is less than the limit speed VL. The A/B policy consists in accelerating to V
′
1 ,
and then braking until the vehicle stops having travelled exactly distance F1. If the free
distance ahead is F = F2, the maximal target speed will be the limit speed VL. The
A/B policy will similarly accelerate first to the limit speed and then brake to stop at F2.
Finally, if F = F3 > F2, then after accelerating to the limit speed VL, the vehicle will
maintain constant speed VL for distance F3 − A(V1, VL) − B(VL) and then brake for
the remaining distance to stop at F3.
Theorem 2. If the speed V of the vehicle is safe with respect to F , i.e.,B(V ) ≤ F ,
then the A/B policy is always safe and efficient for F .
Proof. The safety proof is given by the arguments following Theorem 1. To prove effi-
ciency, we consider three basic driving policies: the A/B policy, the B/A policy and the
C/B policy. The other possible policies, such as accelerating, driving at constant speed,
accelerating and then braking, can be obtained as combinations of the three basic ones.
We show that the A/B policy yields the minimal travelling time.
We decompose the free distance ahead F into two segments: one segment of length
D = F − B(V ) and one segment of length B(V ). Due to the additivity property,
the distance B(V ) is always required regardless of the applied polices in order to brake
safely from speed V . So the policies may differ only in the time needed to travel distance
D. In the A/B policy, the vehicle travels distance D by first accelerating to the maximal
target speed vM and then braking from vM to V . We denote by tA the time needed to
accelerate from V to vM and by tB the time needed to brake from vM to V . In the C/B
policy, the vehicle first moves at constant speed V for the distance D and then brakes
from V for the remaining distance B(V ). We denote by tD the time needed to travel
D with constant speed V . We show that tD is greater than tA + tB . We denote the
speed function during acceleration by v′(t) and the speed function during deceleration
by v′′(t). Then we have v′(t) > v for tA > t > 0 and v′′(t) > v for tB > t > 0. Since
D = v ∗ tD =
∫ tA
0
v′(t)dt +
∫ tB
0
v′′(t)dt >
∫ tA
0
vdt +
∫ tB
0
vdt = v ∗ (tA + tB), we
have tD > tA+ tB . Thus the A/B policy takes less time and it is more efficient than the
C/B policy.
In the B/A policy, the vehicle first brakes and accelerates for the distance D and
then brakes for the remaining distance B(V ). We denote by t′B + t
′
A the travelling time
of D by braking and accelerating. By applying a similar reasoning, we can show that
t′B+tA > tD. Thus the C/B policy is more efficient than the B/A policy. This concludes
the proof.
The above result implies that for the given free distance F , the A/B policy is the
most efficient and that from the given initial speed there is a maximal speed that mini-
mizes the travel time of F .
4 Controller design for collision avoidance
4.1 The control principle
We study a control principle for collision avoidance based on the above results. We
consider that the vehicle speed can change between a finite set of increasing levels
v0, v1, ..., vn, where n is a constant, v0 = 0 and vn equals to the limit speed vL. The
triggering of acceleration and braking from one level to another is controlled according
to the free distance ahead and based on bounds computed as follows, for each speed
level vi, i ∈ [1, n],
– Bi = B(vi) is the minimal safe braking distance needed for the vehicle to fully
stop from speed vi;
– Di = A(vi−1, vi) + B(vi) is the minimal safe distance needed for the vehicle to
apply an A/B policy accelerating from speed vi−1 to vi and then braking from vi to
stop.
We show that the following function specifies the highest safe speed level v as a
function of the current speed of the vehicle V and the free space ahead F , provided that
their initial values V0 and F0 are such that B(V0) ≤ F0.
v = Control(F, V )
v =

vi+1 when V = vi ∧ F = Di+1
vi−1 when V = vi ∧ F = Bi
vi when V = vi ∧Di+1 > F > Bi
Fig. 4. Illustration of the collision avoidance principle for n = 4
Note that this control principle is purely functional. It assumes that changes of the
free distance ahead F can be continuously monitored to instantaneously produce corre-
spomding speed changes.
Fig.4 illustrates the principle for n = 4 speed levels. As the value of F increases, the
speed of the vehicle switches between levels. Safety is preserved by construction. The
vehicle can accelerate to a higher level, if it can safely and efficiently use the available
distance by applying an A/B policy. It brakes to a lower level if the available distance
reaches the bound for safe braking.
Fig. 5. Automaton modelling the collision avoidance principle
Fig.5 provides a scheme for the computation of Control(F, V ) in the form of a fi-
nite state automaton. The locations correspond to traveling at constant speeds v0, ..., vn.
The transitions model instantaneous acceleration and braking steps triggered by condi-
tions involving the free distance F and the precomputed bounds Bi and Di. If the
control location is vi and the free distance ahead equals to the minimal safe acceler-
ation distance (i.e., F = Di+1), then the automaton moves to location vi+1 after the
speed is accelerated to vi+1. If the free distance ahead reaches the minimal safe braking
distance (i.e., F = Bi), then the automaton moves to location vi−1 after the speed is
decelerated to vi−1. Recall that Bi = Bi−1 + B(vi, vi−1). Thus, after braking to vi−1
there is still enough space for safe braking. Note that checking point conditions makes
sense because F has no jumps and computation is instantaneous. If none of the trigger-
ing conditions holds, then the free distance ahead F is such that Bi < F < Di+1. The
automaton stays at location vi and the speed remains unchanged.
Note that the automaton of Fig.5 cannot be implemented as a controller because
we assume that F is continuously observable and changes of the controlled speed are
instantaneous. In the next section, we show how to design controllers by refining this
automaton.
Theorem 3. The collision avoidance principle is safe. Moreover, its efficiency is strictly
increasing for increasing number of speed levels n.
Proof. Safety can be proved by induction on the number of speed levels. First, we
prove that the transition to v1 is safe. If v = 0 and the condition F = D1 holds,
speed can change to v1. The transition to v1 needs distance A(v0, v1). When this speed
is reached, the distance F ′ will be such that F ′ ≥ (F − A(v0, v1)) = B(v1), since
D1 = A(v0, v1) + B(v1). Thus the vehicle is still safe at v1 because the remaining
distance is greater than the minimal safe braking distance.
Assuming safety for v = vi, we prove safety for v = vi+1. Safety for v = vi means
that F ≥ Bi and it will remain safe as long as the speed level does not change. We
distinguish two cases. If F ≥ Di+1 = A(vi, vi+1) + B(vi+1), then we can accelerate
to speed vi+1 and the free headway distance will beF ′ ≥ (F−A(vi, vi+1)) = B(vi+1),
which implies that the safety condition still holds for vi+1. If Bi+1 < F < Di+1, then
the speed remains unchanged and there is enough distance to brake for vi+1. If F =
Bi+1, then the vehicle will brake to the lower speed vi, which is safe by assumption.
Thus it is also safe for v = vi+1.
Note that as speed can be enforced to discrete levels, efficiency is achieved only
when F = Di for some i; otherwise, the highest safe speed level is chosen. Let Vinit
be the speed of the vehicle and Fi = A(Vinit, Vi) + B(Vi) be the distance needed for
the application of an A/B policy from Vinit to Vi. Then we consider two cases:
– Either F = Fd1 such that B(Vinit) ≤ Fd1 ≤ Fn in which case by construction
there exists some vi such that vi ≤ Vd1 ≤ vi+1 as shown in Fig.3, where Vd1
is the maximal speed such that Fd1 = A(Vinit, Vd1) + B(Vd1). In that case the
controller will apply the best A/B policy to reach from Vinit the speed level Vi. The
loss in efficiency Vd1−Vi is determined by the max of the difference Vi+1−Vi for
i ∈ [1, n]. Thus, for increasing number of speed levels, the efficiency increases.
– Or F = Fd2 such that Fn < Fd2. In that case the controller will accelerate to the
allowed limit speed vn and then will keep the speed constant for distance FC =
Fd2 − Fn. Then if the obstacle ahead is fixed, it will have to brake for distance
B(vn). In that case there is no loss of efficiency as the limitation comes from the
limit speed of the vehicle.
This concludes the proof.
As explained, computing the exact value of the optimal speed for a given distance
may be costly. Considering discrete speed levels allows pre-computing for each level
both the minimal safe braking distance and the minimal safe accelerating distance be-
tween levels. In that manner, we avoid the computational complexity of adjusting in
real time the vehicle speed.
4.2 Controller design
We propose two controllers applying the presented collision avoidance principle. The
first controller is synchronous driven by periodic updates of the free distance variable
F for an adequately chosen period. The second controller is asynchronous in the sense
that the free distance variable F is updated sporadically.
Synchronous controller The controller interacts with its controlled environment (the
vehicle) through input and output events as shown in Fig.7. The output s is a state
variable indicating the currently applied command (i.e., accelerating, braking or con-
stant speed). The input event UpdateF signals the periodic measurement F ′ of the free
distance with period T , while input events ca and cb signal the completion of the accel-
erating and braking command respectively. Initially, the speed v of the vehicle is set to
a level vi that is safe with respect to the initial distance F (i.e., F ≥ B(vi)).
The controller is a refinement of the ideal controller where we assumed that speed
changes were instantaneous. Its is described by the following set of guarded commands
Fig. 6. Extended automaton modelling the synchronous controller
Fig. 7. Inputs and outputs of the synchronous controller
and also depicted as an extended automaton for the sake of clarity in Fig.6.
do
 ∃i ∈ [1, n].s = Csp(vi) ∧ F ′ ≥ D′i+1
→ s := Ac(vi, vi+1); ba
 ∃i ∈ [1, n].s = Csp(vi) ∧B′′i ≥ F ′ ≥ B′i
→ s := Br(vi, vi−1); bb
 ∃i ∈ [1, n].ca ∧ s = Ac(vi, vi+1)→ s := Csp(vi+1)
 ∃i ∈ [1, n].cb ∧ s = Br(vi, vi−1)→ s := Csp(vi−1)
 UpdateF → F ′ := F
od
For guarded commands we adopt the usual semantics: whenever the condition on the
left hand side holds, the actions on the right hand side are executed. Note that the input
events appear as conditions while the output event appear as actions. The variable s
keeps track of the kinematic state of the vehicle that is abstracted by the control states
Ac (accelerating), Br (braking) and Csp (moving with constant speed).
We denote by Ac(vi, vi+1), Br(vi, vi−1) and Csp(vi) the commands of accelerat-
ing from speed vi to vi+1, braking from vi to vi−1 and moving with speed vi, respec-
tively. When the vehicle is moving with constant speed, transition UpdateF is triggered
periodically to receive the most recent measurement of F . Once the triggering condi-
tion of accelerating (braking) is met, transition ba (bb) is taken to initiate the command
and move to location Ac (Br) waiting for its completion.
We do not make any assumption about the time spent at locations Ac and Br. We
simply assume that the distances needed for accelerating and braking are A(vi−1, vi)
and B(vi, vi−1), respectively. We explain below how the guards of the controllable
transtions bb and ba are computed.
We estimate the maximal safe approximations of the triggering conditions F ≥ Di
and F = Bi of the ideal controller in terms of F ′, the most recently updated value of
F . When the vehicle moves at speed vi, the variables F and F ′ satisfy a relation of
the form F = F ′ − ki(t), where ki(t) = vi ∗ (t mod T ). That is ki(t) = 0 when F is
updated and ki(t) < vi∗T . We assume that T is small enough so thatDi−vi∗T ≥ Bi,
that is, we do not miss the braking threshold value Bi in a period. This is reasonable
given that in practice the updating period T is usually less than 50 milliseconds. Notice
that the minimal value of F will be reached for F = F ′ − vn ∗ T . Thus, it is enough to
require that F ′ ≥ Di + vn ∗ T holds for accelerating and that Bi + 2 ∗ vn ∗ T ≥ F ′ ≥
Bi + vn ∗ T holds for braking. So we adjust the triggering bound for accelerating to
D′i = Di + vn ∗ T and the least and upper bounds of the interval triggering a braking
to B′i = Bi + vn ∗ T,B′′i = Bi + 2 ∗ vn ∗ T .
Asynchronous controller Inputs and outputs of the asynchronous controller shown in
Fig.8 differ in that the input event UpdateF receiving the measurement F ′ of the free
distance occurs sporadically. Furthermore, this controller needs an internal clock event
tick with period4t to estimate the vehicle’s position.
Fig. 8. Inputs and outputs of the asynchronous controller
Fig. 9. Extended automaton modelling the asynchronous controller
The asynchronous controller differs from the synchronous controller in the way of
estimating the values of the free distance F . Its is described by the following guarded
commands and also depicted as an extended automaton in Fig.9.
do
 ∃i ∈ [1, n].(s = Csp(vi) ∨ s = Upd) ∧ F ′ ≥ D′i+1
→ s := Ac(vi, vi+1); ba
 ∃i ∈ [1, n].(s = Csp(vi) ∨ s = Upd) ∧B′′i ≥ F ′ ≥ B′i
→ s := Br(vi, vi−1); bb
 ∃i ∈ [1, n].s = Upd ∧D′i+1 > F ′ > B′′i → s := Csp(vi)
 ∃i ∈ [1, n].ca ∧ s = Ac(vi, vi+1)
→ F ′ := F ′ −A(vi, vi+1); s := Csp(vi+1)
 ∃i ∈ [1, n].cb ∧ s = Br(vi, vi−1)
→ F ′ := F ′ −B(vi, vi−1); s := Csp(vi−1)
 ∃i ∈ [1, n].tick → F ′ := F ′ − vi ∗ 4t
 UpdateF → F ′ := F ; s := Upd
od
As previously we adopt similar notations. The variable s keeps track of the kinematic
state of the vehicle that is abstracted by the control states of the automaton Ac (acceler-
ating), Br (braking) and Csp (moving with constant speed).
As the updates of F are sporadic, we use a local variable F ′ to keep track of the
possible changes of F since its latest update as follows. When the vehicle completes an
accelerating or braking step (i.e., when the completion transitions ca or cb occur), F ′ is
updated by F ′ − A(vi, vi+1) and F ′ − B(vi, vi−1), respectively. When the vehicle is
moving with constant speed v, F ′ is updated by F ′ − v ∗ 4t for every time period4t,
where 4t is a time constant such that the upper bound of the uncertainty  = vn ∗ 4t
in the estimation of F remains small.
When an UpdateF occurs, from any state the controller moves to an update state
Upd. This is represented by grouping the three locations of the automaton into a macro
state with an outgoing transition to location Upd. Then without delay from location
Upd, the controller compares F ′ to the corresponding bounds and moves to a safe
target location accordingly.
As for the synchronous controller, the upper and lower bounds of the triggering
conditons of bb and ba are modified so as to take into account the uncertainty  in the
computation of F . In fact if x is the remaining distance to travel since the last update
of F , we have x ≥ F ′ ≥ x− . So the condition for accelerating to speed vi+1 from vi
becomes F ′ ≥ D′i+1, where D′i+1 = Di+1 +  and the condition for braking from vi
becomes B′′i ≥ F ′ ≥ B′i where B′′i = Bi+2∗  and B′i = Bi+ . The safety argument
still holds for this asynchronous controller because it simply applies after each update
of F an A/B policy for the considered speed levels.
Theorem 4. Both the synchronous and the asynchronous controller yield safe control
policies for collision avoidance.
Proof. The safety proof for the synchronous controller follows the same reasoning as
in the previous theorem .
The safety proof for the asynchronous controller is by induction on the updates of
the free distance F . Assume that an update starts and the vehicle is at speed level vi
that is safe for F ′ = F . Then until the next update occurs, the controller will keep
track of the free distance by updating F ′ in every 4t time: F ′ := F ′ − vi ∗ 4t and
in that manner at any time F ′ will be such that F ′ +  ≥ x, where x is the remaining
distance to safely travel since the last update of F . The controller applies an A/B policy,
which is safe because the conditions for accelerating and braking have been modified
to take into account the maximal deviation . So, the vehicle will move safely until the
next update or stop after F ′ reaches a value B′′1 ≥ F ′ ≥ B′1 and trigger the braking
command Br(v1, 0).
Following the same reasoning as in the previous theorem, we can deduce that the ef-
ficiency of the two controllers strictly increases for increasing number of speed levels n.
Furthermore, the efficiency depends on how frequently F is updated as the accelerating
and braking conditions take into account the uncertainty about the values of F . Thus,
the controllers may not be able to fully utilize actually available free distance. While
as explained for synchronous controller, the loss in efficiency depends on the value of
vn ∗ T , for the asynchronous one it depends on the maximal time difference between
two successive updates of F .
5 Experimental evaluations
We have implemented both the synchronous and the asynchronous controller in the
open-source autonomous driving simulator Carla [4]. In the experiments, we consider
scenarios where the controlled vehicle is driving towards a moving vehicle ahead as
shown in Fig.10. The speed of the front vehicle is described by the periodic function
vf (t) = vf0 + vf0 ∗ sin(ω ∗ t), where ω = 2 ∗ pi/Tf , Tf is the period of this speed
function and vf0 is a constant. We choose vf0 = 14 m/s, and thus the speed of the
front vehicle changes in the interval [0, 28m/s] (i.e., [0, 100.8 km/h]). We set the limit
speed of the controlled vehicle to be 32 m/s (i.e., 115.2 km/h). The initial distance
between the two vehicles is F (0) = 5m and the initial speed of the controlled vehicle
is 0. Thus, the controlled vehicle is initially at a safe state. The accelerating and braking
rates of the two vehicles are both constant a = b = 2m/s2.
In order to evaluate the performance and the quality of the controllers, we measure
both the speed changes of the controlled vehicle and the relative distance between the
two vehicles, reflecting the occupancy of the road. The smaller the distance is, the higher
the road occupancy is. We perform experimental evaluations in two settings.
– In Setting 1, we consider that the free distance ahead is equal to the relative distance
between the two vehciles, that is we ignore the speed of the front vehicle. This
corresponds to a strict safety policy that avoids collision even when the front vehicle
suddenly stops e.g. in case of accident.
– In Setting 2, we consider that the free distance is the relative distance increased by
the braking distance of the front vehicle.
Fig. 10. Simulation environment in Carla
In both settings, we perform the evaluations with respect to three parameters: the
period Tf of vf , the number of speed levels n of the controlled vehicle and the period
T of sensing the free distance. For experimental purposes, the safe accelerating and
braking distances for eight speed levels v[8] = {4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32} are pre-
computed as shown in Table.1 and configured in the implementations. The distances
are obtained for constant accelerating and braking rates a = b = 2m/s2.
Table 1. Safe accelerating and braking distances for the eight speed levels
speed level
(m/s)
Accelerating dis-
tance (m)
Braking distance
(m)
Distance for A/B
policy
v1 = 4 A(v0, v1) = 4 B(v1) = 4 D(v0, v1) = 8
v2 = 8 A(v1, v2) = 12 B(v2) = 16 D(v1, v2) = 28
v3 = 12 A(v2, v3) = 20 B(v3) = 36 D(v2, v3) = 56
v4 = 16 A(v3, v4) = 28 B(v4) = 64 D(v3, v4) = 92
v5 = 20 A(v4, v5) = 36 B(v5) = 100 D(v4, v5) = 136
v6 = 24 A(v5, v6) = 44 B(v6) = 144 D(v5, v6) = 188
v7 = 28 A(v6, v7) = 52 B(v7) = 196 D(v6, v7) = 248
v8 = 32 A(v7, v8) = 60 B(v8) = 256 D(v7, v8) = 316
Setting 1: First, we evaluate how Tf affects the performance for two different values
Tf = 10 s and Tf = 30 s. We assume that the environment updates the free distance
variable with period T = 0.02 s, and that the asynchronous controller estimates this
variable with period4t = 0.005 s (as shown in the controller in Fig.9).
Fig.11 compares the simulation results for the synchronous (left part) and the asyn-
chronous controller (right part). The top two figures compare the dynamics of the free
distances. For both controllers, the relative distance is periodic with period Tf in the
steady regime. It decreases for increasing period Tf . For instance, it is around 57.27m
for Tf = 10 s, while for Tf = 30 s it is 20.11 m. In fact, for slower speed changes,
the controller has more time to adjust the movement of the controlled vehicle and can
better utilize the available distance.
Fig. 11. Simulation results for the synchronous (left part) and the asynchronous controller (right
part) for Tf ∈ {10 s, 30 s} and n = 8 speed levels and sensing period T = 0.02 s.
Fig. 12. Simulation results for the synchronous (left part) and the asynchronous (right part) con-
troller for four different speed levels (n ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}) and Tf = 20 s, T = 0.02 s.
Fig. 13. Simulation results for the synchronous (left part) and the asynchronous (right part) con-
troller for two different sensing periods (T ∈ {0.1 s, 10 s}) and Tf = 20 s, n = 8.
Note that the results are similar for the two controllers when period Tf changes. A
minor difference is that the minimal relative distances are smaller for the asynchronous
controller: when Tf = 30 s, the minimal relative distance of 20.11 m for the syn-
chronous controller reduces to 17.78 m for the asynchronous controller. The bottom
figures compare the speed changes of the controlled vehicle (solid lines) in response
to the speed changes of the front vehicle (dotted lines). Similarly, the speed of the
controlled vehicle gets closer to vf for increasing period Tf . For both controllers, the
maximal speeds increase from 16m/s to 20m/s when the period increases from 10 s
to 30 s.
In the second set of experiments, we evaluate how the number of speed levels n
affects the performance of the two controllers for four different values of n = 2, n = 4,
n = 6 and n = 8. The period of the front vehicle’s speed function is Tf = 20 s and the
sensing period is T = 0.02 s.
The results for the synchronous controller are shown in the left part of Fig.12. We
can see that for decreasing number of speed levels, the relative distance increases. For
instance, when n = 8, the minimal relative distance is 33.32 m, which becomes 60.49
when n = 2. Thus, occupancy deteriorates when less speed levels are used. This result
simply confirms a consequence of Theorem 3. The bottom figure compares the speed
changes of the controlled vehicle in response to the speed changes of the front vehicle.
The result similarly shows that the maximal speed of the controlled vehicle increases
from 16 m/s to 20 m/s with the number of speed levels. However, beyond a certain
number, the performance improvement is negligible: e.g., the speed curves for n = 6
and n = 8 are almost identical.
For the asynchronous controller, similar results are shown in the right part of Fig.12.
For decreasing number of speed levels, the relative distance increases. The minimal
relative distance changes from 33.02 to 57.61 m when the speed level reduces from 8
to 2. These benchmarks show that varying the number of speed levels does not result in
significant performance differences between synchronous and asynchronous controller.
However, the relative distances for the considered speed levels are slightly smaller for
the asynchronous controller.
In the third set of experiments, we evaluate how the period T of sensing the free
distance ahead affects the performance for T = 0.1 s and T = 10 s with n = 8
and Tf = 20 s. The results for the synchronous controller are shown in the left part
of Fig.13. Note the transient behavior when the period T increases. In the speed dia-
gram the controlled vehicle accelerates from 0 to the highest speed 24m/s because the
largest relative distance is reached only in the transient phase. Furthermore, for increas-
ing period, the range of the relative distance increases. When T = 0.1 s, the relative
distance changes in the interval [34.16, 153.14] m , which becomes [12.30, 161.60] m
when T = 10 s as the uncertainty about the free distance increases with the period.
For the asynchronous controller, the results are shown in the right part of Fig.13.
Note that period of sensing has significant impact on the performance of the asyn-
chronous controller. For increasing period, the relative distance considerably increases.
Furthermore, compared to the synchronous controller, there is no obvious oscillation
during the transient phase. This is because the asynchronous controller computes an
estimation of the free distance at each local time step. As a result, the controlled ve-
hicle will not accelerate to the highest speed 24 m/s, which is the possible for the
synchronous controller.
Fig. 14. Simulation results for the synchronous controller with and without considering the brak-
ing distance of the front vehicle (right and left part, respectively) for Tf ∈ {10 s, 30 s}.
Setting 2: in the subsequent experiments, we evaluate how performance changes
when we take into account in the evaluation of the free distance the braking distance
of the front vehicle travelling with speed vf (t) = vf0 + vf0 ∗ sin(ω ∗ t). At time t its
braking distance is vf (t)2/2∗bf for a constant braking rate bf . We take bf = 5m/s2 for
experimental purposes. Then the corresponding safe accelerating and braking distances
are D′i = Di − vf (t)2/2 ∗ bf and B′i = Bi − vf (t)2/2 ∗ bf .
In Fig.14, Fig.15 and Fig.16, we compare the performance of the synchronous con-
troller with and without considering the braking distance of the front vehicle (right and
left part, respectively). In Fig.14 we compare the results for Tf ∈ {10 s, 30 s} with
Fig. 15. Simulation results for the synchronous controller with and without considering the brak-
ing distance of the front vehicle (right and left part, respectively) for four different speed levels
n ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}.
Fig. 16. Simulation results for the synchronous controller with and without considering the
braking distance of the front vehicle (right and left part, respectively) for two sensing periods
T ∈ {0.1 s, 10 s}.
sensing period T = 0.02 s and speed level n = 8. We can see that when taking into
account the braking distance of the front vehicle, the relative distance between the two
vehicles becomes much smaller. For instance, the minimal relative distance decreases
from 20.11m for Tf = 30 s to 11.26m. Furthermore, the distance decreases when the
period Tf increases as shown in the top figures in Fig.14. The performance improve-
ment can also be observed from the speed diagrams shown in the bottom of Fig.14. Fi-
nally, the speed range of the controlled vehicle becomes larger and the maximal speed
increases from 16m/s to 20m/s for Tf = 10 s.
Similar results are shown in Fig.15 and Fig.16, which compare the results for four
different numbers of speed levels n ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8} and two different sensing periods
T ∈ {0.1 s, 10 s}, respectively. The relative distance reduces significantly when taking
into account the braking distance of the front vehicle. For instance, the minimal free
distance drops from 33.32 m to 17.29 m when n = 8. These results confirm that by
taking into account the movements of the front vehicle, the controlled vehicle can move
more aggressively and better utilize the free distance ahead.
6 Conclusions and future work
The paper presents a novel framework and approach for safe and efficient collision
avoidance for self-driving vehicles. The framework is model-based and assumes that
control policies are implemented as the application of acceleration, braking and con-
stant speed commands. The presented algorithms do not make any assumption about
the dynamics of the controlled vehicle except that there are functions giving the trav-
eled distance when the speed of the vehicle changes by some quantity. Additionally,
the assumptions about the vehicle’s environment are minimal as it is described by a
function F (t) giving at any time the free available distance ahead.
The assumption that all vehicles move in the same direction as the controlled vehicle
does not limit the generality of our approach. The same algorithm can be applied by
adequately taking into account movements in the different directions in the estimation
of the free headway distance. If for instance the distance between the controlled vehicle
and the front vehicle moving in the opposite direction is F ′ at time t, then the free
space ahead can be estimated as F = F ′−D(4t), where4t is the time needed for the
controlled vehicle to completely stop by braking from its current speed, and D(4t) is
the maximal distance travelled by the front vehicle within time4t.
The same algorithm can be adapted to two-dimensional movement. In that case,
the function F (t) can be defined as the maximal convex area containing the controlled
vehicle and such that all the obstacles are outside this area. The distances A(V, v) and
B(V, v) for initial and target speeds respectively are also replaced by adequately ap-
proximated convex areas so that the safety test boils down to area inclusion that can be
efficiently decided.
The presented approach differs from others based on control theory or controller
synthesis in that it guarantees at a high level of abstraction both safety and efficiency. We
progressively relax the assumption about perfect real-time knowledge of the free space
and provide solutions that are safe and relatively efficient even when the free space is
sporadically updated. Furthermore, switching between a set of speed levels depending
on pre-computed conditions drastically reduces the computational complexity of the
decision process. This also allows to reduce the control algorithm sensitivity to changes
of the environment while keeping driving safe and robust. Experimental results show
that it is easy to get implementations under minimal assumptions about the operational
environment.
This work is part of a larger project on the design of safe and efficient autopilots
for self driving cars. Future developments include the adaptation of this algorithm to
two-dimension movement where the free space function provides areas around the con-
trolled vehicle as well as the integration of our algorithms in autonomous car models of
the Carla simulator.
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